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ABSTRACT
Anders was a preeminent critic of technology and critic of the atomic bomb as he saw this
hermeneutico-phenomenologically in the visceral sense of being and time: the sheer that of its
having been used (where the Nietzschean dialectic of the ‘having been’ reflects the essence of
modern technology) as well as the bland politics of nuclear proliferation functions as
programmatic aggression advanced in the name of defense and deterrence. The tactic of
sheerly technological, automatic, mechanical, aggression is carried out in good conscience.
The preemptive strike is, as Baudrillard observed, the opponent’s fault: such are the wages of
evil. Violence in good conscience characterizes the postwar, cold war era and the present day
with its mushrooming effects of neo-fascism under the titles of national security and antiterrorism. Karl Krauss’ 1913 bon mot regarding psychoanalysis as the very insanity it claims
to cure [Psychoanalyse ist jene Geisteskrankheit, für deren Therapie sie sich halt] has never been
more apt for political translation — straight into the heart of what Lacan called the Real
which has ‘always been’ the political register. Where Habermas and heirs have tended to
disregard Anders (as they also sidestep Heidegger and Nietzsche), just as most philosophers
of technology (and indeed philosophers of science) have ignored the political as well as the
ethical in their eagerness to avoid suspicion of technophobia, we continue to require both
critical theory and a critical philosophy of technology, a conjunction incorporating Ander’s
complicated dialectic less of art in Benjamin’s prescient but still innocent age of technological
reproduction but and much rather “on the devastation of life in the age of the third
industrial revolution.” Thus rather than reading Anders’ critique of the bomb as limited to a
time we call the Atomic Age — as Anders himself varied Samuel Beckett’s 1957 Endgame
(Fin de partie) as Endzeit that is “Endtime,” here invoking the eschatological language of
Jacob Taubes as Anders does — this essay connects his reflections on the bomb with his
critique of technology and the obsolescence of humanity as of a piece with our dedication to
hurling ourselves against our own mortality. This concern with the violence of technology,
this hatred of the vulnerability of having been born and having been set on a path unto
death (the mortal path that is the path of life) inspires Anders’ engagement with the sons of
Eichmann — the heirs of those who designed and executed the Nazi death camps and
extermination chambers of the Holocaust — and the sons of Claude Eatherly — the heirs of
both those who designed and those who as pilots (banality of banality) deployed the
bombings that exploded the supposed stuff of the sun itself contra the Empire of the Sun in
the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We, embroiled as we are in wartime after wartime,
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suppressing public protest on a scale like never before, in country after country across the
globe, cannot dispense with Anders today.
KEYWORDS
Günther Anders, Walter Benjamin, apocalyptic blindness, endtime, holocaust, humanity
The door in front of us bears the inscription
“Nothing will have been” and from within: “Time
was an episode.” Not however as our ancestors
had hoped, between two eternities; but one
between two nothingnesses; between the
nothingness of that which, remembered by no
one, will have been as though it had never been,
and the nothingness of that which will never be.
— Günther Anders, Commandments in the Atomic
Age1

1. Angels
Walter Benjamin, Günther Anders’ cousin, had traced the mystical art of the
one and only Paul Klee, his possession, which he had acquired from Gershom
Scholem, of Klee’s 1920 Angelus Novus, now the iconic postcard on every
college teacher’s door, the angel of history, to recollect the word painting of the
open mouth “His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread,”2 so
that we can conflate as we do, Klee and Benjamin, one with the other.
A Klee painting named Angelus Novus shows an angel looking as though
he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. …
His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events,
he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage
and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing
Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly, Burning Conscience: The case of the Hiroshima Pilot,
Claude Eatherly, told in his letters to Günther Anders, Preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by
Robert Jungk (New York: Paragon, 1961), p. 11.
2 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Benjamin, Illuminations:
Essay and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1969), p. 257.
1
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from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the
angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into
the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him
grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.3

Fig. 1. Paul Klee, Angelus Novus, 1920.
Gift of Fania and Gershom Scholem, Jerusalem; Courtesy of the Israel Museum, Jerusalem.

In an end time, that is to say, at the end of time, the strobe light of horror
showed the still figure, the frozen figure of the angel of every apocalypse. And
of course, let us think of Rilke, and his Duino Elegies, angels were on everyone’s
lips. Ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich.
Aren’t they all? Where are you when you see angels? What has become of
your life, what has become of your eyes, that you can see angels? Günther
Anders explores the mode of such modalities, können and nicht können , to be
able to and not to be able to, as opposed to Shakespeare’s rag in Jack Benny’s
voice and the filmic icon of the same, Nazi Germany, Hollywood style: to be,
not to be, being and non-being. Non-being as a possibility, real in a different
sense than it had ever been before for any time since we humans had become, in
Hölderlin’s words, a conversation with ourselves, for ourselves. For Anders, as
he writes in 1975, these are old-fashioned worries, the problem now as ever is to
come to terms with what we have learned to do.
3

Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” p. 257-258.
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This is also the source of and point for Anders’ invocation of Goethe’s 1797
‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’ [Der Zauberlehrling] and not only because
Hollywood had translated this figure to the film center of a cartoon musical
opera, Fantasia. Once again we cite: “We are incapable of not being able to do
what has once been done. It is thus not can-do-ability [Können] that we lack,
but no-can-do-ability [Nichtkönnen].”4 Anders is well aware of the Goethean
source of his insight but he traces this with Heideggerian precision, indeed a
Nietzschean acuity — Nietzsche always claimed that one had to have many
eyes — towards the prospect of understanding the end-time, as this time, our
time, is the time of ending things, everything, the world, ourselves, and every
other thing on it. For Anders, as for Nietzsche as I have argued in connection
with Nietzsche’s critical philosophy of science, as for Heidegger as I also
underline his philosophy of modern technology, what is important is to consider
the ultimate, the further consequences in every case. Thus where scholarship
looks to certain genocides, but not to others, Anders traces the inevitable
lockstep of the ability to destroy and the inability to locate or to place the
blame on this people, this political constellation, rather than that. And that
mucks up everything for the political theorists, the political philosophers, the
pundits and the casual reader all of whom find themselves asking how he dare
say such things. And so we bring in the experts to tell us that Anders was
simply a polemicist, a ketzer, hetzer, or as we say in English: a pain in the neck.
Which bluntness coheres with the terms Anders used to characterize school or
university scholarship. The higher your position, the better the school you find
yourself at, the more you fit the mold: without exception. And Anders refused
appointments because he knew that there was no way to change anything from
within: the only thing that university appointments do is produce university
rank and file, lockstep as true for the most cutting edge grad student as for the
most distinguished professor. If few of us have read Anders, certain scholars
over the years have done so and have had recourse to him in their work from
Peter Sloterdijk to Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology
who cites Anders’ differentiation of the ordinary thinking of end-times
traditionally speaking from the thinking of such times in a nuclear era: “a
naked apocalypse, that is to say an apocalypse without a kingdom.”5 But I
mention the non-reading because in a scholarly world where Heidegger is read,
Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Über die Zerstörung des Lebens in Zeitalter der
dritten industriellen Revolution (Munich: Beck, 1984), p. 395.
5 Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology (Fortress Press, May 1, 2004),
p. 217, here citing Anders, Endzeit und Zeitende, 1959.
4
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even if he is often deplored, or where Adorno is studied, with all the limits that
go along with that and where Benjamin is even revered, there is simply no
excuse for leaving out this fellow traveler when it comes to the themes of power
and violence.
It is violence in perfect good conscience that characterizes war as it
characterizes the postwar, the cold war era but also the present day with its
mushrooming effects of neo-fascism under the titles of national security and the
terrorist, from surveillance to full-body (meaning-naked body) searches to
surgical strikes to individual-sized Armageddon in the form of drones, all in the
name of anti-terrorism. Karl Krauss’ 1913 bon mot regarding psychoanalysis as
the very insanity it claims to cure [Psychoanalyse ist jene Geisteskrankheit, für
deren Therapie sie sich halt] has never been more apt for a political translation
straight into the heart of what Jacques Lacan called the Real which has of
course ‘always been’ the true political register.6 It is not for nothing that Žižek
was not only a philosopher as a young man but a student of the thinking of
Lacan in Paris. Where Habermas and his heirs disregard Anders (as they also
manage to set aside or minimally to sidestep Heidegger and Nietzsche and so
on), just as most philosophers of technology (and indeed philosophers of
science) have ignored the political as well as the ethical in their eagerness to
avoid suspicion of technophobia — a reserve that characterizes most political
theory that considers technology from George Kateb to John McCormick
(Gilbert Germaine is an exception, John Street is an exception, Langdon
Winner too is an exception but who reads these thinkers?). Latour is no
exception, that’s the deal, and so we read him. Say truth to power in the
academy and you are out. And Günther Anders (as well analysed by so many
authors) was always already ‘out,’ excluded from the academy.7 And as he
See for this, Babich, “On the Order of the Real: Nietzsche and Lacan” in: David Pettigrew
and François Raffoul, eds., Disseminating Lacan (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1996), pp. 48-63.
7 There are a number of authors who write in German on Anders. Note that to say this is not
to claim that his work is particularly ‘well-received” at the university level, indeed these days
in Germany Nietzsche’s work not to mention Heidegger’s or even Adorno’s work is
increasingly less discussed especially in philosophy departments, and it is not even necessary
to have read Adorno let alone specialized in work in order to be named a recipient of the
prestigious Adorno Prize which Anders himself was honored to receive in 1983. See, for
example, the contributions to be found in Konrad Paul Liessmann, ed., Günther Anders
kontrovers (Munich: Beck, 1992) or else Margret Lohmann’s dissertation, Philosophieren in der
Endzeit. Zur Gegenwartsanalyse von Günther Anders (Munich: Fink, 1996) or indeed Ludger
Lütkehaus, Philosophieren nach Hiroshima. Über Günther Anders (Frankfurt am Main:
6
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continues to be left out, the following is only an effort to count him in. The
reader will, I hope, forgive me, if my style is also open to other names along the
way.
2. Time
We are used, we modern authors, to positioning ourselves in time. And we long
ago forgot Augustine’s cautionary warning that we take ourselves to know such
an ordinary notion as time.8 Even those who reflect on Nietzsche’s
Zarathustran reflections on time tend to skip over the literally contradictory
contours of Augenblick, the intersecting courses, past and future, colliding in the
gateway Moment. Despite the warning title Of the Vision and the Riddle.
Nietzsche scholars simply solve the problem or are sure that there was never a
problem in the first place.
Thus we scholars, we scientists, we knowers, all pronounce on time: we claim
that it speeds up (when we are having fun, when we are busy, when we are late)
and complain that it slows down (when we are waiting for an anxiously
anticipated event, when we are bored, when we are boiling water) and we descry
and map the lines of time.
Time always seems to have a spatial dimensionality, thus Günther Anders
reflects on the absurdity of defining let alone distinguishing the two, and he
reflects too on the absurdity of the project, pointing out that and just to be
sure, and as the average person might answer that he has never once found
himself in danger of “confusing the one with the other.”9
By comparison with Jacob Taubes and Hans Jonas and many others of the
day, arguably also including Anders’ cousin Walter Benjamin all of whom
either wrote volumes on eschatology or essays on the same, Anders offers us no
more than an anti-eschatology: reflections on the end, of the apocalypse, on
Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1992) as well as Lütkehaus’ Schwarze Ontologie. Über Günther
Anders (Lüneburg: zu Klampen, 2002). In English, studies heretofore are limited to Paul van
Dijk, Anthropology in the Age of Technology, The Philosophical Contribution of Günther Anders
(Amsterdam, 2000) as well as my own essay, which was itself originally published in German,
Babich, “O, Superman! or Being Towards Transhumanism: Martin Heidegger, Günther
Anders, and Media Aesthetics,” Divinatio (January 2013): 83-99.
8 “What then is time’? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I want to explain it to someone
who asks, I don’t know.” Augustine, Confessions, XI, 14.
9 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band. Über die Zerstörung des Lebens im
Zeitalter der dritten Industriellen Revolution (Munich: Beck, 1984 [1980]), p. 350.
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annihilation, mutually assured and what not, which is to say that he writes
about the “endtime,” saying to be sure that “the future has already ended.”
Where Anders differs from others is that he brings his philosophical, even his
theological reflections as we shall see down to earth. Anders who has little
patience as Adorno with Heidegger but who, unlike Adorno had no problem
using Heideggerian insights wherever needed, could rebuke Heidegger for
describing the human being as the ‘shepherd of being.’ And if religious and
poetic associations serve the image of the shepherd well, the philosophical
image of the shepherd has been problematic since Thrasymachus, handily
floored Socrates by pointing out that there is no difference between shepherd
and tyrant: from the view point of the ones “shepherded,” that would be the
sheep as it is they that are preserved for ends that are not their own and it is
they that are always brutally killed in the end.
But even if one hears the language poetically, through every bucolic register,
and even if one hears the language through the tonalities of the New
Testament, Heidegger’s language still misses the point for Anders,
“The Shepherd of Being,” that which Heidegger still yet very biblically,
that is to say anthropocentrically, suggests – whereby he vastly overrates
“the position of the human being in the cosmos” (which couldn’t give a
damn about whether we continue to exist or have already disappeared),
no, we are certainly not “shepherds of being.” Far rather we might
consider ourselves the “shepherds of our product- and gadget-world” as a
world that needs us, more strikingly than we do ourselves, as servants
(e.g., as consumers or possessors).10
The language is the language that runs throughout the first volume
composed as a monograph in 1956 (the second volume is put together seriatim
and published in 1980) and that is the language of obsolescence: the human
being is at an end, as it were and all time henceforth is and can only be at an
end, the end of days, the end time. Where traditional eschatologies take a leap
into the mystical, the gnostic, the beyond, Anders stays squarely in the here
and now. Because for Anders that is where the end transpires: not later, not in a
world to come, but always already here.
These reflections on time are compelling for Anders above all not for religiotheological reasons, like the aforementioned Taubes or else like Jonas but and
10

Ibid., p. 281.
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not even for the traditionally epistemological reasonings of a Kant, but just on
moral grounds. If Anders thus begins his second volume by reflecting on the
inversion of the Lords’ Prayer, ‘Give us this day our daily bread’ into a new
mantra, ‘give us this day our daily eaters,’ what is required is the same culinary
desperation Adorno also discoved at the heart of the culture industry: the world
needs consumers, social followers, more than it needs products because, as
Anders already noted, this is Heideggerian challenging forth replete with
Machenschaft, the Beiträge, plus the lectures to the club of Bremen, and Anders
is much punchier: we make products to make products to make products. To
this extent marketing and the production of market is our only occupation and
preoccupation. To this end all advertising and what is today’s digital marketing
but advertising? What is today’s academic hot topic, the digital humanities,
but advertising? Anders’ point is that the only imperatives we know are the
imperatives of what can be done: if it can be done, it should be done. Heidegger
says this too, of course, and to this day our sole concern is not with what one
should do, what a quaintly Kantian question, but how we might do and how we
might forever continue to do (this is the meaning of what we call
‘sustainability) what we can do: Das Gekonnte is das Gesollte. As a result Anders
has even less patience, if that is possible, with the idea that technology might
be some neutral means (he has a field day with the language of ends and means
when it comes to the atomic bomb and the point of its production) or that it
might be somehow be in our control or even within our purview. The epigraph
Anders sets to the second volume as a whole is significant: “It is not enough to
change the world.” Writing in 1980, one is well beyond any imperative that
would call for changing the world, in a good Marxian voice, just because as
Anders writes, we always do that anyway. What is lacking is an interpretation
of what we have done, especially in our times where, as he argues, our ability to
act far exceeds our comprehension. Later in the book, written two years earlier,
his chapter on “The Obsolescence of History” will make the same point again
with a trio of dated epigraphs — and, in a way, only the dates should strike us
in this trifecta: Politics is our destiny (1815) The economy is our destiny (1845)
Technology is our destiny (1945)

3. New Rules
The old commandments had failed and Anders had ‘new’ commandments.
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The ‘commandments’ were originally published in 1957 and Günther Anders
managed to secure English-language circulation by sharing them with Major
Claude Eatherly, the weather reconnaisance pilot, who gave the go-ahead, or all
clear for the bombing of Hiroshima. Two points first: dropping an atomic bomb
is a very different thing than ordinary bombing missions. If, for the safety of
the bombers themselves, weathermen always played a crucial role, in this case
one needed to know still more about wind and weather than ordinarily so, for
precision bombing now had different implications. Secondly, the trajectory of
flight path, immediately evasive, flying up and away after dropping the bomb,
also testifies to this difference. If bombers are inevitably at a distance from the
work of their actions, those who dropped the bombs over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were and had to be clear about the devastation they would bring
because the backwash in this case could touch them in the sky. Eatherly was
infamous not for having flown the mission, he was of course, like every
successful bomber, a war hero, but for having had second thoughts about it.
In the commandments Anders sent to Eatherly, we can read, as if it were the
highest moral imperative and this is indeed how Anders meant it: “widen your
sense of time.”11 Anders has his reasons for this as he introduces this broadened
sense of time by calling for an equally broadened breadth of ‘moral fantasy:’12
you must broaden your ethical sensibility “until imagination and feeling
become able to comprehend and to realize the enormity of your doings.”13
Anders who was concerned with the phenomenological effects of the endtime [Endzeit], was also concerned what he calls the “guiltless guilty” as this
ontological characteristic is now the destiny of the human, following the
objective, physical, thingly circumstances of the modern technological era.
Anders used the word ‘technicity,’ to the irritation of newspaper commentators:
the same irritation has meant that scholars and popular authors could
successfully ignore Anders just as they have ignored Jacques Ellul, and to a
lesser degree Martin Heidegger on the same topics.
By contrast Marshall McLuhan would be inhaled. Technology can’t be the
problem: the medium is, the message is.
Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly, Burning Conscience: The case of the Hiroshima Pilot,
Claude Eatherly, told in his letters to Günther Anders, Preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by
Robert Jungk (New York: Paragon, 1961), p. 13. See too the more mainstream title, William
Bradford Huie, The Hiroshima Pilot: The Case of Major Claude Eatherly (New York: Putnam,
1964).
12 Anders and Eatherly, Burning Conscience, p. 13.
13 Ibid.
11
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In his correspondence with Eatherly, which if I am correct was Anders’ way
to communicate with American English speaking commentators, Anders did
not make it difficult for those same commentators to dismiss him. Indeed,
Anders put his key point, which was also his most difficult point, on the very
first page, almost summing up the heart of the masterwork that has yet to be
translated into English. Thus Anders writes to Eatherly — a letter to a former
American airman, incarcerated for petty crimes in a psychological hospital or
institution (where for the most part Eatherly would remain) and hence written
out of the blue, as it were — by speaking of nothing more esoteric than
‘technification,’ speaking in a Heideggerian sense but no less in a Kantian sense
of what Anders there describes as the:
“technification” of our being: the fact that to-day it is possible that
unknowingly and indirectly, like screws in a machine, we can be used in
actions, the effects of which are beyond the horizon of our eyes and
imagination, and of which, could we imagine them, we could not approve
— this fact has changed the very foundations of our moral existence.
Thus, we can become “guiltlessly guilty,” a condition which had not
existed in the technically less advanced times of our fathers.14
By thus speaking of our ‘technification,’ the same technology on every social
level that Jacques Ellul would for his part claim as the wager [Enjeu] of the
century in a series of his own books,15 or of what Heidegger far less popularly
called the “essence” of modern technology, Anders could emphasize that it
would be this essence into which we ourselves would be absorbed. Thus Ander’s
first letter to Eatherly patiently articulates the points Anders had developed in
his 1956 Obsolescence of Humanity.16
For Anders, we are our tools, that is to say, we are our gadgets, our devices,
our things, our objects. By saying this, Anders is far from today’s object
oriented ontologists (I say this admitting the wide variability of these writers,
and I say this noting that in some cases Anders is even cited —and the sighting
of any citation, in the wild as it were, is rare enough). But Anders differs. He
Anders and Eatherly, Burning Conscience, p. 1.
Jacques Ellul, The Technologcial Society, John Wilkinson, trans. (New York: Vintage,
1967). The original title was in advance of Anders’ work: La technique ou l’enjeu du siècle
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1954).
16 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band. Über die Zerstörung des Lebens in
Zeitalter der dritten industriellen Revolution (Munich: Beck, 1984 [1980]).
14
15
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does not think that we can simply think the thing, the object, the gadget and
his reason for this reticence is the very hermeneutic and phenomenological
reason that this objective is not accessible to us simply because we are already
the object of technology as the subject of history, and hence we are ordered to
(in this sense as we saw above we are the shepherds of), we are claimed by
things, by objects. The fact that we have made them is quite irrelevant and this
irrelevance as this is the scope, the range, the breadth, the sheer size (this is
Jünger’s titanism or giganticism), of modern technology. And, as we shall see,
this same signal irrelevance of the connection between what we know and what
we have made or done, pace Kant or Vico, is the point of Anders’ reflections on
Goethe’s “The Sorceror’s Apprentice,” Der Zauberlehrling.
Anders’ main concern was the same non-neutrality that Heidegger for his
own part also emphasized at the start of his The Question Concerning
Technology. Good or bad, neutral or non-neutral, either point is committed in
advance to the same. Anders’ argument is that once we have an object, we
have it. Because it is the object that has us, we can—as a result—claim neither
detachment nor sovereignty. Other authors reflecting on technology have made
similar points in similarly uncompromising fashion especially Heidegger and
Ellul but what bears further reflection is that Anders’ point would not be
directed to the ontological circumstance of doing and not doing. Thus Anders
was more concerned for very phenomenological purposes with ‘having.’ And
this also meant that Anders’ concern was with the inescapably moral
fraughtness: this is what it is to be ‘guitlessly guilty,’ this is what it means for
all of us, to accept the designation of banal evil as a descriptor for all us, every
one of us a son of Eichmann, Hiroshima everywhere.
The condemnation for Anders is the damnation of being and not being in the
context of the things of our age. There is no way to be, simply to be, in the
world in the wake of the atom bomb. It is in this sense that Anders can reflect
in 1966 and contra Lukács and many others, that given the literally ‘negative
religion’ that was the atomic fact — and by no means only the mere threat of
nuclear annihilation — everything the past century had previously considered
under the rubric of nihilism, by comparison with that same “possibility of
‘annihilation’ turned out to be sheer culture-hall nonsense.” For Anders,
“Nietzsche, even the beastly serious Heidegger, come across as laughable before
the madness [Folie] of this possibility.”17 The possibility is that of a literal
annihilation, in fact the creation, the production of nothingness, eliminating all
17

Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band, p. 404.
154

BABETTE BABICH

humanity and culture and all history with it. The question of nuclear
annihilation thus explicitly extends beyond the Heideggerian possibility of
impossibility. This is of course the heart of what Anders, a good Heideggerian,
had to mean by the Obsolescence of Humanity, which is of course nothing but the
‘Obsolescence of Dasein’ and precisely qua Dasein or as such. What is at stake
for us as mortal beings is no longer anything so classical as our mere mortality,
that we, as beings who can die, are bound to die and bound to the loss of our
ownmost possibilities for being but and much rather that today we are no
longer ‘mortal’ but have been converted into simply “‘killable’ entities.”18
For Anders, as we have already quoted him in the epigraph to the current
essay, we human beings are no longer in a position to simply regard our
lifetime, even as Mallarmé might have done, as simply random, as chance tossed
into the realm of possible being, or as Nietzsche wrote: “a hiatus between two
nothings.”19 H i s Commandments in the Atomic Age are mortal reflections as he
writes to Claude Eatherly and as is immediately clear upon reading them, offer
an array of spiritual exercises. Much rather than a re-furbished vision of the ten
Commandments, as it were, these are to be read as rules for the soul’s direction,
meditations of a Stoic kind, beginning, just as Marcus Aurelius begins Book Five
of his Meditations: let this, not that, be your first thought upon arising.
The point here is that there has been a reversal, a turn, a change and things
are now and forever more no longer as they were. If that sounds extreme it is
only because Anders remembers, as Benjamin does, what makes history history
and that prerequisite is always a recording hand. With an angel, we are covered
even after the apocalypse. Take away the angel and you have as Nietzsche also
reflects, as he writes in the parable of the mad man who comes to seek and then
to announce the death of god in his The Gay Science, that having murdered god
— “We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers.”20 — we have at
the same time managed “to wipe away the entire horizon.”21 Nietzsche
continues to elaborate the significance of nothing other than the very last words
Ibid., 405. Anders concludes the section by denouncing the situatedness of dying one’s
own death as Rilke had spoken of this and as Heidegger had made his own claim to the same.
For Anders, using a Heideggerian argument against Heidegger, the thing about dying is that
the individual’s loss of his own singularity in dying is and can hardly be one’s “own.” Ibid.,
p. 407.
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), Vol. 12, p. 473.
20 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §125.
21 Ibid.
18
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of the Christ as he hung on the cross, asking for forgiveness on our behalf,
because we his murderers, guiltlessly guilty, had and could have had no idea
what we were doing:
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither
is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we
not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions?
Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite
nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become
colder? Is not night continually closing in on us?22
The scene of the Commandments as Anders’ translator put his Meditations in
the Atomic Age is as bleak. In the wake, not of the death of God, but the
explosion of the power of stars, we are, in Anders’ terms “ killable,’: as
humankind and as a whole, not only henceforth but in every other sense as well.
Thus humanity as such is not only limited to “today’s mankind” or “spread
over the provinces of our globe; but also mankind spread over the provinces of
time.”23 The expanse is literally unimaginable — which does not mean that
Anders has any trouble explaining it, and he gives Eatherly a little lesson in
history as he does:
For if the mankind of today is killed, then that which has been, dies with
it; and the mankind to come too. The mankind which has been because,
where there is no one who remembers, there will be nothing left to
remember; and the mankind to come, because where there is no to-day,
no to-morrow can become a to-day. The door in front of us bears the
inscription “Nothing will have been” and from within: “Time was an
episode.” Not however as our ancestors had hoped, between two
eternities; but one between two nothingnesses; between the nothingness
of that which, remembered by no one, will have been as though it had
never been, and the nothingness of that which will never be.24

Ibid.
Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly, Burning Conscience: The Case of the Hiroshima Pilot,
Claude Eatherly, told in his letters to Günther Anders, Preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by
Robert Jungk (New York: Paragon, 1961), p. 11.
24 Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly, Burning Conscience: The case of the Hiroshima Pilot,
Claude Eatherly, told in his letters to Günther Anders, Preface by Bertrand Russell; foreword by
Robert Jungk (New York: Paragon, 1961), p. 11.
22
23
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Anders’ own expression is shot through with the Nietzschean language, the
door or the gateway, as we have already seen, is Nietzschean, the formula of the
two nothingnesses, as we also have seen, is Nietzschean, but the tenor and the
tone is hermeneutic phenomenology: a meditation on being and having been, on
being and not being. This is the Sophoclean me phynai,25 as Nietzsche also
reflects on it, on what it would be never to have been at all, where just this is, as
Nietzsche also reflects, utterly impossible for humanity, which leaves us the
curiously second best option of dying soon, as Yeats translates Sophocles and
sets as the last lines of his A Man Young and Old,
“Never to have lived is best, ancient writers say;
Never to have drawn the breath of life, never to have looked into
the eye of day;
The second best’s a gay goodnight and quickly turn away.”26
Anders who brings to his reflections literary considerations amidst
philosophical and theological considerations also argues in the high spirit of the
original members of the Frankfurt School (neither Habermas nor Honneth need
apply, nor, to be sure, would they wish to). Thus Anders compares the
“consumer terrorism,” he describes, i.e., say compulsory consumption, to the
even more significant compulsion to use. This is the compulsion of the applied.
Applied terrorism is the terrorism of what happens to be on hand, what is
available for use, and this applicable and therefore deployable terrorism is for
Anders quite literally the reason atom bombs were detonated as they were and
in the first place: President Truman, as Anders points out, happened to have
had two bombs available, therefore there would be two targets. The only
question was where they would be. That is the space question. The time
question concerned only how soon they could be used. And given diplomacy
and the ontic details of concluding world war two, Germany was out of the
question, so the space in question, the where of the bomb, followed the question
of time, the when of when the two bombs one happened finally to have on
hand, could ultimately get to be used.
But beyond consumer-terrorism and applied-terrorism, beyond having
become less mortal than mere ‘killable’ beings, Anders reflects that we are killed
25Sophocles,

Oedipus at Colonnus, « mê phunai ton hapanta nikai logon: to d’, epei phanêi… »
(1224f)
26 W. B. Yeats, A Man Young and Old, in The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats: Volume I: The
Poems, ed. Robert Finneran (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 231.
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when we are killed by an atom bomb not by human hands, and by nothing so
old-fashionedly humane as human intention or human passion. We do not die
at human hands because hands — that’s the point of obsolescence — do not for
Anders enter into it at all. Like Major Claude Eatherly who gives the all-clear
from his plane, The Straight Flush, 27 and thus like the command to execute the
mission, like the bombers of the Enola Gay, who dropped the ridiculously aptly
named hydrogen bomb: Little Boy, such a death when it comes, would come
either, shades of Eichmann (but with drone warfare the shadow falls more
clearly) come
from agents somewhere, thousands of kilometers distant from us,
following orders in accord with duty, or indeed through brainless and
sightless machines, that have long since been emancipated from the
hands and the intentions of their creators and users.28
As Anders goes on to point out, the constellation shifts from the tragic to the
ridiculous or idiotic, and this shift relieves us of no part of our own
responsibility for the outcome. The overabundance, the excess production of
nuclear warheads (this is not a matter of number as much as it is a matter of
deadly power) is something that has been happening since 1945 — and it has
hardly decreased it has only intensified in recent years. With every increase in
“overkill,” Anders likes to use the term in English in his German text, what also
increases is the likelihood that each of us has now to perish at what is, in effect,
however objectly or mechanically, our own hand.29 We are all at fault. The
consequence, if one is blunt, and Anders was blunt to a fault, is that one could
no longer, though this hardly stops today’s philosophers of religion, from talking
as if God were in his heaven. Thus “Scheler’s dictum,” as Anders quotes it here,
that “he believed in the devil (in contrast to the theologians of his own
generation who believed in the existence of god but not the devil)”30 would thus

A “straight flush” is jargon for a poker hand of five cards in sequence and of which there
are better and worse kinds. In Eatherly’s case, the name of his B-29 Superfortess was
illustrated on the nose of the plane with a depiction of a toilet bowl with a downed Japanese
pilot in the toilet and using the toitet seat as an flotation device with a disembodied hand on
the right-hand side poised to pull the chain, for a “straight flush.”
28 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band, p. 406.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 407.
27
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attain a new vitality for us today. As Anders argued, the devil would appear to
have taken up a new residence.31
Far from any symbolism, the apocalypse for Anders could henceforth have
nothing whatsoever to do with any kind of second coming, any sort of new
Reich, any last judgment, or anything at all that one might need to ‘interpret.’
What we no longer have is hermeneutic esotericism: there is no ‘meaning’ in
need of subtle divination.
Now, the End-time of today is of a ‘massive’ sort. It is in need of no
symbolization. For this possibility (and that means if it is a matter of
technology: the inevitability) there are historical examples: the facts
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and that of the secret from-no-one calculation
regarding the ‘overkill’ capacity of today’s stockpiled weapons. In our
situation the sheer fact that the end has yet to enter in is no refutation of
the reality of the danger, no counterdemonstration of the fact that our
time is a, indeed the endtime.
The ‘Now’ of this fact of the facticity for all and for each one of us of what
has been, of what has been done by human beings lies (or better said: should lie)
as a weight upon all human beings. This is for Anders, the Promethean guilt of
action, of original sin, and it has been a problem since the time of the change of
the gods, for the ancient Greeks this was the change from the age of the titans
to the Olympians gods, for Jews and for Christians, this goes back not only to
Adam and Eve but above all to the time of Cain. In another way of telling the
story, this guilt or acquired shame has been with us since Enkidu stopped to
sleep with the woman of the city paid to seduce him, and who as a result lost
the patience, the grace, the time that allowed him to run in innocence alongside
the gazelle, the lion, and so on. Thereafter, Enkidu, the wild man, would not
free the animals from the traps city hunters had set for them, but being himself
caught in and by another kind of city hunter’s trap, he would be lost to his
forest companions, with little to do except follow the whore who had come to
lure him to the city.
Sin, for Anders, Promethean shame, needs no specific confession: it is neither
Jewish nor Christian nor pagan but purely attendant upon our humanity. It is
the human condition that we be ashamed of having been born, that we be
preternaturally conscious of our limits (this is what Heidegger called our
31

Anders writes that “the devil has moved into another apartment.” Ibid., p. 410.
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ontological ‘excellence’) as these are the limits of the just and only human. Our
oldest stories are stories of being ashamed of nakedness, ashamed of our naked
bodies, of being embarrassed to be seen, appalled at our own frailty. And by the
same token, we are hell bent on becoming, at any price, more than that, more
than we are. Our tools, our objects, our tanks, our planes, our bombs, these
days such things also include our digital prowess seem to be just the ticket. And
it all starts with a fig-leaf.
With the atom bomb in particular, humanity succeeded in crystallizing the
terror of laying siege to a city, wasting it, compressing it down in time and
spatial act to the press of a button, mere minutes from start to finish. Over and
out.
At least in theory — and as Anders already at the beginning of the 1960’s,
writing to Eatherly took care to note (and in the interim his point has only been
made all the stronger, in ways unimaginable to most of us — not that we think
about it): the bomb, although hardly ever thought about (this would be
different for Major Eatherly who knew such things far better than most) was no
static achievement. Indeed, since the bomb was developed, progress consisted
in further perfecting it, meaning as this was hardly lost on Anders, that that
same project to develop a better bomb was all and only about increasing its
deadliness, magnifying the destructiveness of such a negative genie-in-a-bottle.
The problem with the project from the outset, following Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, was only that the genie had already been out for a detonating fall,
twice over. As Anders put it:
For the goal that we have to reach cannot be not to have the thing; but
never to use the thing, although we cannot help having it; never to use it,
although there will be no day on which we couldn’t use it.32
It was Anders’ technically attuned thinking, student as he was of Edmund
Husserl — his dissertation on “Having” concerned epistemological ontology33
— and of Heidegger, it was thus his techno-epistemological sensibility that led
him to offer the above reflection on the consequences that follow simply from
what we do as modern, technical human beings, living at a tempo like none
before, “the completely new, the apocalyptic kind of temporality, our
temporality.”34 This temporality of our time is the end-time: all time henceforth
Anders and Eatherly, Burining Consicence, p. 20.
Stern, Über das Haben. Sieben Kapitel zur Ontologie der Erkenntnis (Bonn: Cohen, 1928).
34 Anders and Eatherly, Burning Conscience, p. 12.
32
33
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must be counted from here and accordingly and because we are at the end, we
affect the future, any possible future, like no other epoch in the history of
humanity.
Anders offers one of the first articulations of a point we now so take for
granted that we simply refer to the concept by a number, counting generations
— we count, biblically of course, seven generations, and then because it is now
a cliché we stop thinking about it. As Anders explains:
the people of the Western world, since they, although not planning it, are
already affecting the remotest future. Thus deciding about the health or
degeneration, perhaps the ‘to be or not to be’ of their sons and grandsons.
Whether they, or rather we, do this intentionally or not is of no
significance, for what morally counts is only the fact.35
The point here is that the only thing that matters is our objects, that is,
what we have, what we possess and what we have done. As a consequence there
is no question of intention, there is no question of rightly or wrongly deploying
such objects. Atom bombs, napalm, lets make it real for us today, drone
strikes, fracking, nuclear power plants, GMO crops, etc. These things cannot be
used well. Thus Anders writes to conclude the second volume of his Obsolescence
of Humanity, “it is not can-do-ability that we lack, but no-can-do-ability.”36
Heidegger had earlier begun his own reflections on technology by taking about
the limitations of thinking that technology was either an instrument (the
instrumental definition) or a human attribute (the anthropological definition).37
Instead, and much, much rather another essence, so Heidegger argued, was at
work in modern technology.
4. Time-Space
Time, as we have seen that Anders also reflects upon it, is always found to have
a kind topology, a spatial dimensionality, complete with the topographic
features of a particular landscape — think of Dali’s The Persistence of Memory
or for pop culture, think of The Twilight Zone’s milder television metaphors: we
are time-travelers of an antique adept’s variety, less the high future of a Star
Anders and Eatherly, Burning Conscience, p. 13.
Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band, p. 395.
37 H. and then
35
36
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Trek cruising the edge of a singularity in space-time than the late 19th century
future of a Jules Verne.38 We hitchhike in our fantasies equipped with nothing
like the latest scientific vision, a mere hundred years old, of time-travel via
rocket-ships and jet-powered speed, to take us, thank you Dr. Einstein, back in
time without noticing it. We prefer 19th century cabinets. Dr. Who needs no
spacesuit. Nor is it an accident that the latest language to describe the
(imaginary) transforms of the digital are borrowed — hat tip to Evgeny
Morozov, thanks to techno-media scholar Jussi Parikka — from Harry Potter’s
creator. J. K. Rowling’s horcrux is the perfectly articulated image for our
multitasking minds.

Fig. 2. Salvador Dali. The Persistence of Memory. 1931. Oil on canvas. © ARS, NY

Rowling, the horcrux’s creatrix, had her own borrowed rabbit (or lion) up
her sleeve or tucked into her hat, even if she did not name the master of
wonderland and its topographical transforms, morphological shifts of size and
form, down the rabbit hole and all. The mathematician author Lewis Carroll
and his ‘Wonderland’ is thus the poster-boy, the ideal author of the digital era
because even with no acquaintance with Alice, and no acquaintance with any of
Invoking Schlegel’s description of the historian as a backwards turned prophet, an image
doubtless precisely relevant for his cousin Benjamin’s description of the facing orientation of
Klee’s Angel of history, Anders suggests that we need to demand the same of today’s
prognosticator or futurologist. In this same context, Anders claims Jules Verne as the patron
saint of modern technology: “the prophet of the technological revolution.” Anders, Die
Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band, p. 428,
38
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her adventures (who was the rabbit? who was the walrus? who needs any of
them, we have Angelina Jolie forever — in her avatar avant la lettre in Lara
Croft: Tomb Raider), we have the very idea. Mentioning, the mere mention of
the wondrous is all we get and all we need: we know everything we need to
know about the mathematico-logical transform of our new projected selves.
We are, aren’t we now, transhuman, posthuman, humanity 2.0 (surely we’re
due for an upgrade to humanity 3.0 or even 4.0 by now).
And then, just for the locus of the boggart in the wardrobe as such, Rowling
also had her C.S. Lewis.
I mention boggarts and wardrobes, cabinets and time travel, because when
we shift levels (and note that we are still talking of topologies), one should be
struck by the persistence of our representation of time as time in history is
always a picture, an image, iconic. As if we might be surprised that anything
with two dimensions might be other than a picture.
Theodor Adorno to bring Anders’ competition, not that we read him either
on the matter of technology as we should, and not that today’s Frankfurt
School bothers to do anything but silence him in favor of themselves, was also
struck by iconic, canonic time, as Berthold Hoeckner rightly notes.39 And this is
always a claim with particular insistence in Adorno where music is, of course, the
art of time as we like to say. With music we are also always and even if
Hoeckner is, like most musicologists, most philosophers, most academics,
inattentive to Anders (or Stern in this context) speaking about Anders who also
(as Stern) offered his own reflections on time, musical time,40 as
phenomenologically, as hermeneutically as Hoeckner himself.41 Hoeckner, like
Anders, like Adorno (if also although Hoeckner does not note this, like
Nietzsche), attends to the time of the now — Jetzt-Zeit — in his discussion of
the ‘star’ in Beethoven, echoes of contellations important for Adorno as for
Benjamin, Anders, and even indeed Schoenberg.42
Quoting Adorno’s
Berthold Hoeckner, Programming the Absolute: Nineteenth-century German Music and the
and the Hermeneutics of the Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
40 I discuss Anders in this context and in connection with Adorno on the space of sound and
Nietzsche on time in music in Babich, The Hallelujan Effect: Philosophical Reflections on
Music, Performance Practice and Technology (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).
41 Hoeckner, to be sure, does not attend to the breadth of this array as I am discussing
Anders here and to be sure he prefers the more common constellation, as most scholars do, of
names to bother to name in his own study.
42 Hoeckner’s reflections are broad ones but I argue here that to have the measure he wishes
need even more damned names (in the Fortean sense) are required than Anders’ own. I am
39
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“aesthetics of appearance” (under the important presumption of an allergy to
Heidegger that spares any engagement with the notion as it also appears early
in Heidegger’s Being and Time), Hoeckner characterizes Adorno’s “aesthetics of
Augenblick as an aesthetics of apparition: ‘the artwork as appearance
approaches most clearly the apparition, the celestial vision.’”43 Of course as we
have already suggested, the same lines of thinking are also to be found, traced
and elaborated in just this context in Anders. For Hoeckner — and here one
misses a discussion of both Heidegger and Nietzsche, what will be needed is a
“hermeneutics of the moment.”44 With this desideratum the author must
disentangle himself from Adorno who exemplified perhaps more than any other
author the lived anxieties of influence (Heidegger, and Gadamer but also
Anders and the same Habermas Adorno had intellectually discounted but also
and certainly, whether we like it or not — and we do not like it — Hannah
Arendt as well). In addition, there are other authors who also write on dialectics
and time in conjunction with Benjamin, making very close arguments for
Hoeckner regarding Adorno’s supposed lacks, as Günter Figal has analysed
these. Focusing, as Hoeckner does, on Adorno’s attention to the standstill,
Hoeckner disagrees with Figal. There are less lacunae in Adorno than an
abundance of eyes, as it were — the image of the Argus-eyed is significant as it
should be for Hoeckner’s reading — than a veritable constellation of insights
into that same dialectic. Thus we read that “what intrigued Adorno was
Benjamin’s objectification of the historical process in the image.”45 The key
passage everyone cites from Benjamin’s Passagenwerk is thus worth citing here:
What has been coalesces in lightning like fashion with the Now. In other
words, the image is the dialectic at a standstill. For while the relationship
of the present to the past is a purely temporal one, the relationship of
what has been to the Now is dialectical, of a pictorial rather than a
temporal character.46
speaking of the now nearly forgotten Siegmund Levarie and I discuss this (in another
context) in Babich, The Hallelujan Effect, see p. 7 as well as 196ff.
43 Hoeckner, Programming the Absolute, p. 16.
44Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 17.
46 Ibid. See for the same citation, Günter Figal’s chapter “Aesthetic Experience of Time” in
his For a Philosophy of Freedom and Strife: Politics, Aesthetics, Metaphysics, Wayne Klein,
trans. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 121. Figal cites Benjamin, GS
V: 1, 578.
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The point made here overlooks a key point in Nietzsche (and it is instructive
that authors for all their enthusiasm, are at pains to keep Nietzsche at a
distance). In addition there is the eschatological as such, in this case the very
picture of it, which is the picture-book Dante, in the images inextricably
associated with him since the 1850’s, not only for us today but for Anders, and
Adorno, and Benjamin ever since Paul Gustave Doré’s illustrations came to
stand in Dante’s name and place, an achievement arguably to match that of
any other illustration in any other book.
Doré’s pen drawing of the Empyrean in Dante’s Paradiso, Canto 31,
published mid-19th century, combines as a rebus both the power of the sun as
life and in death as this famously comes to J. Robert Oppenheimer’s lips as he
invokes the language of the Vedic tradition, “Now I am become death, the
destroyer of worlds.”47 As Peter Sloterdijk takes up this same association, the
“Bomb is really the only Buddha that Western reason could understand. Its
calm and its irony are infinite. … As with Buddha, everything that could be
said is said through its existence.”48

Fig. 3. Trinity Atomic Bomb Explosion, 16. Juli 1945, 05:29:45.
J. Robert Oppenheimer, on the thoughts and reactions on July 16, 1945 at the Trinity
atomic bomb test site. “We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed... A
few people cried... Most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture
the Bhagavad Gita; Vishnu is trying to persuade the prince that he should do his duty, and
to impress him takes on his multi-armed form, and says, ‘Now I am become death, the
destroyer of worlds.’ I suppose we all thought that, one way or another.” In: The Decision to
Drop the Bomb, NBC documentary, 1965.
48 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 131-132.
47
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Fig. 4. Paul Gustave Doré, Empyrean, Dante, Paradiso, Canto 31. Public Domain.

To talk about Anders Endzeit und Zeitenende,49 we need Nietzsche’s eternity
in fact as this is the moment, the now. Again and as already intimated at the
start, this is mapped out in space, a space of infinite dimension, fore and aft, as
Nietzsche depicts it and without which dimensionality it is impossible to think
the Augenblick as Nietzsche also names the moment. Time stands still and in
what Nietzsche could describe as two roads, mapping infinities past and future,
the crossover, the junction is the moment, Augenblick,50 the same word Adorno
uses.
And why not the moment, the blink of an eye, an image which already closes
off the seen, relegating it to a lost glimpse? Why not in Anders’ time, in
Adorno’s time, Benjamin’s time: a time when the apocalypse seemed sure just
because as Anders emphasized with respect to Hiroshima, and although we
scarcely like to talk of this at all, in Vietnam, or in Iraq as Baudrillard did not
fail to try to tell us, or closer to home for the German Anders, already in
Dresden, as Winifried Sebald has reminded us, it had already taken place. For
Anders, indeed, and starting with his own experience of it, the first world war
had already done that and the second war as that came and ended, not once,
but twice, and then again with two bombs, could not but repeat the same
message, once more with feeling, and a reprise, da capo. The encore at the end of
49
50

Anders, Endzeit und Zeitenende. Gedanken über die atomare Situation (Munich: Beck, 1972).
I explore this in further detail in Babich,
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the second world war, and the constellation, the order of events would matter
for Anders, changed everything beyond imagining, beyond rectification, beyond
redemption or correction.
This is for Anders in his retrospective reflections on the “Obsolesence of
Space and Time” part of the problem, emphasizing, as Gadamer would also
always do in his lectures when I was a student, the importance of
consummation, satisfaction, fulfillment, what Anders simply called “having.”
It is instructive that Anders begins his 1959 reflections with the illustration of
‘Schlaraffenland’51 but it is even more significant that we can barely translate
this term into English although we Americans have perfected its realization on
earth arguably more than other people, at least in the Disney version.
Schlaraffenland is a world where sausages leap perfectly broiled, perfectly
willingly, into our always hungry mouths, no effort at all, guiltlessly,
automatically, and in this child’s fantasy, not really for children because there
is beer that has the same eager proclivities to satisfy any thirst we might have,
the only name we have is Candyland, or the media obsession with the heaven of
certain confessional persuasion: complete with a given number of promised
virgins springing, not unlike the sausages, unbidden, uncoaxed, and unfazed
into the martyr’s arms.
Our age crosses space and time, obliterating, as Anders also emphasizes all
distances, spatial and temporal. We are effectively as he argues, rendered by
technological means into spaceless, timeless beings, not in the sense of
transcendence but as he writes of imperviousness, blindness. This is apocalyptic
blindness and thus we no longer have any sense of history or indeed memory.
But the problem of the modern time-less (lacking time as we do), space-less
(lacking a sense of the world around as we do) way of being is precisely that it
transcends nothing at all. We are, as Anders goes on to argue, mediated in all of
this by our technology, which is always to be found just where we put it:
precisely, exactly “in the ‘middle’ of the fulfillment of needs or ‘facilitating’
[‘Vermitteln’] the manufacture of products.”52
5. Whose Holocaust? Which Genocide?
Who counts?
Anders, „Die Antiquiertheit von Raum und Zeit,” in Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen;
Zweiter Band, p. 335.
52 Ibid., 336.
51
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If some have followed the apotheosis, as it were, of the cattle car as this was
borrowed along with the entire factory slaughterhouse project, technique,
assembly line-layout, and so on, from Chicago’s stockyards and thence to
Auschwitz, Dachau, Buchenwald,53 we can also trace the lines, the tracks of the
trains that ran throughout a war of destroyed transports. These traintracks
that could have been bombed were never destroyed and Hitler not only got the
trains to run on time, but the trains that fed the final solution ran without fail.
A transport always arrives at its destination, to vary Jacques Lacan while
keeping the same spirit. In the same spirit, these are the ashes of which Derrida
also speaks, Anders talked about things not even a Klee could illustrate. No
paintings are possible, one is immediately moved to film Hiroshima, Mon
Amour, and even that shudders. Meshes of non-representation. Hiroshima,
Nagasaki, and we have no idea what we are talking about. And then students of
Adorno prattle about a Bilderverbot. God forbid that we care to speak of this, of
these people, foreign to us, in foreign places, alien beings, who are they? We
continue to require both critical theory and a critical philosophy of technology,
a conjunction incorporating Anders’ complicated dialectic less of art in
Benjamin’s prescient but still innocent age of technological reproduction but
and much rather Ander’s reflecvtions “on the devastation of life in the age of
the third industrial revolution.”54 Thus Anders would talk not about enemy
fascism (which was an easy sell as many authors know to their advantage) but
and much rather the American, the good-guys, the non-fascist, non(supposedly)-totalitarian, but very democratic (despite its complete secrecy)
controversion of just-war ideology, transforming it into just and only a war
after the war had ended. For all by themselves, in the midst of the Japanese
effort to surrender — surrenders are diplomatic things, that take diplomatic
intervals of time, negotiation, the business of sovereignty and legitimacy — the
bomber’s planes would fly as for weeks, indeed for all the years of the
Manhattan Project, it had been planned to fly just those planes, to send them
somewhere appropriate just in order (that would be the end in question) to drop
the winged death, the apocalypse itself. The end fruit of that same project was
two bombs completed just prior to the end of a war (but when does anything
end?) that was finished just a touch too soon before the planes (these would be
the means) were nonetheless launched to destroy cities full of people.
The historian Charles Patterson’s Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the
Holocaust (New York: Lantern Books, 2002) thus borrows its title from Singer’s “The Letter
Writer.” For the quote here, see Patterson, Eternal Treblinka, p. 183.
54 Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen; Zweiter Band.
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If scholars dispute whether one can claim that ordinary German knew or did
not know about the Holocaust, Holger Neering points out that in this case there
is nothing to dispute.55 For more than sixty years, German authors have been at
pains to argue, like Neering, that no one can make that statement about
Hiroshima, about Nagasaki.56 And yet even this point can miss the point. We
are, we remain still in the dark about the atomic attacks on Japan. Thus if the
above description of the timing or the necessity for the bombs dropped on
Japan sounds like an overstatement, that is because, as Americans, we continue
to be in denial, we are, as Anders offered Eatherly a diagnosis for his mental
distress at a distance, are traumatized. And this trauma today is the result of,
as trauma always perpetuates itself as trauma, by means of suppression.
The development of the atom bomb was asecret during World War II (not
only the project as such was a secret but three different locations were created,
likewise in secret, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (uranium), Hanford, Washington
(plutonium) and today the best known of these: Los Alamos, New Mexico. As
one cultural scholar has observed, the development of the bomb, which
involved building the aforenamed cities from scratch, was arguably the best kept
secret of the war. Bertolotti’s analysis is offered by way of an old fashioned sort
of what is today popularly called media archaeology, by way, with perfect
documentation, of a study of print media as the means of both suppression and
controlled dissemination (translation: that is propaganda, translation, to
borrow the language of the masthead of New York Times, that is ‘all the news
fit to print’) during the Second World War.57
The closest we have ever come to this was Dresden, also an aerial
destruction, angels again, firebombed by the British, Bomber Harris who it is
said, knew what he was doing. Winfried Sebald in the English version of his
book The Natural History of Destruction58 used the nihilistic language of Lord
Robert Jungk, Strahlen aus der Asche. Geschichte einer Wiedergeburt, with a preface by
Matthias Greffrath (Munich, 1991) [1959], p. 317; the English edition was published only two
years later as Children of the Ashes. The Story of a Rebirth (London: Heinemann, 1961).
56 Holger Nehring, “Cold War, Apocalypse and Peaceful Atoms. Interpretations of Nuclear
Energy in the British and West German Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements, 1955-1964),”
Historical Social Research, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2004): 150-170. Nehring cites Robert Jungk’s
Strahlen aus der Asche. Geschichte einer Wiedergeburt, with a preface by Matthias Greffrath
(Munich, 1991) [1959], p. 317. Nehring also refers to Anders in the same time era.
57 See David S. Bertolotti, “The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima” in Bertolotti, Culture and
Technology (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1984), pp. 81112.
58 W.G. Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction (New York: Modern Library, 2004).
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Solly Zuckerman, the architect of the Dresden firebombing, to title his book,
and it is a fantastic title.59 The whole point, the whole purpose, the sole, the
one and only end, of waging war is terror.60
6. Anders Gesagt: Once More, with feeling
A student of Husserl (again it is important to say this first) Anders was also a
student of Heidegger as he was a student of Max Scheler (and Anders arguably
gets his ethics from Scheler if not his practical sensibility). Scheler is beyond the
scope of this paper but Heidegger as is already evident is central to the reading
I have offered. If Anders’ scholars tend to eschew Heidegger (and if Heidegger
scholars return the favor by ignoring Anders), Heidegger’s reflections on
technology remain decisive for Anders. I argue that one needs to keep
Heidegger’s criticisms in mind to read Anders (assuming to be sure Ander’s
cutting critiques of Heidegger). To do this, it is necessary to go beyond the
limits of Heidegger scholarship as even Heidegger scholars show little patience
for the sustained and thoroughgoing character of Heidegger’s interest in
technology as indeed in modern science, both which Heidegger thought in terms
closer to Anders’ preoccupation with the same. Heidegger scholars can be the
least valuable resource owing to their concern to excavate their personal
favorite theme which means too that they tend to cut all references to
Nietzsche, leaving Hölderlin (because who understands him?) and certainly
mixing and matching Hölderlin and Rilke (why ever not?), all the while ending
Ibid. he quotes the Swedish journalist Stig Degerman’s 1946 report of nothing so much as a
landscape of destruction at which no one of the inhabitants considered to look “writing from
Hamburg,” as Sebald describes the journalist’s report, “that on a train going at normal speed
it took him a quarter of an hour to travel the lunar landscape between Hasselbrook and
Landwehr, and in all that vast wilderness, perhaps the most horrifying expanse of ruins in
the whole of Europe, he did not see a single living soul” Sebald, “Air War and Literature,” p.
30.
60 Karl Löwith’s “European Nihilism: Reflections on the Intellectual and Historical
Background of the European War,” in Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism,
Gary Steiner, trans. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 173-284 as well as
Karl Jaspers, The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man, trans. E. B. Ashton (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1961). For the specifically American context here, see Herman
Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962) and for a
discussion of Kahn from a present day context, Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of
Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press; 2005).
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by nailing that personal interest to the wall as the whole of Heidegger: be it
being, be it meaning, be it objects, be it god or God, or what have you.
Here I have sought to emphasize that Heidegger, differently from Anders
but also from Jaspers and from Löwith as well as Jünger, sought to criticize
technology and in particular to criticize the sheer idea of the atomic bomb
together with television and film, as Heidegger saw television and radio and
film hermeneutico-phenomenologically in the visceral sense of both being and
time.61
A full elaboration of Heidegger and Anders goes far beyond the scope of this
paper, though it is instructive to note that some elements of such a reading
appear in Sloterdijk’s recent work. This is the sheer that of its having been
(where the Nietzschean dialectic of the ‘having been’ reflects the essence of
modern technology) as deployed, as put to use, as set in motion in addition to
the bland politics of nuclear proliferation as this also functions as programmatic
aggression advanced in the name of defense and deterrence. The tactic of
sheerly technological, automatic, mechanical, aggression is carried out in good
conscience. The very notion of the “preemptive strike” is, as Jean Baudrillard
observed again and again towards the end of his life, absolves the perpetrator
(ergo it was not the English who would be blamed for Dresden, the oddness of
Eatherly’s conscience was not that it, in Anders expression, burned but just
that Americans simply have no blood on their hands for Hiroshima). Blame for
the preemptive strike can always be laid at the opponent’s feet, it is his fault:
such are the wages of evil.
The claim of innocence was hard for Eatherley,62 and similar claims were
hard on soldiers who had fought in Vietnam, especially after their return to
everyday life in the United States, and the dissonance of the claim continues to
be hard — we just call it post-traumatic stress now, denouncing it as we now do
as a “disorder — for today’s fighters in the Gulf, Afghanistan, etc.
Sloterdijk analyses this ‘shock” at the end of his book, The Critique of
Cynical Reason, even going so far, and the present author is grateful for this, as
to invoke Anders. But Anglophone readers looking for the next new thing have
never read Anders (who was never the next new thing, perforce not, having
never been translated into English) or Sloterdijk (who was) and those looking
See Babich, “Constellating Constellating Technology: Heidegger’s Die Gefahr / The
Danger” in: Babette Babich and Dimitri Ginev, eds., The Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic
Phenomenology (Frankfurt am Main: Springer, 2013), pp. 153-182.
62 Claude Eatherly & Günther Anders, Burning Conscience (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1962).
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for today’s next new thing (and it is only today’s new thing that matters) cannot
go back and read what they did not read in the first place. Thus we scholars
trust young scholars who, as Nietzsche once expressed it, “have thoroughly
unlearned the art of reading.” And by the time anyone notices a lack, those
same scholars will have moved on to where they wished to be, all in time to be
replaced by the next set of scholars seeking the next generation of the next new
thing.
The war on terrorism, as Slavoj Žižek observes, is infinitely fightable and
wildly adaptable, transformable. Indeed, our enemies are beautifully invisible: a
powerfully convenient antagonist and the invisible and therefore omnipresent
enemy serves as today’s transformation, the perfection of the sheer automatism
of war. The invisible enemy all around us is the equivalent of the acephalic and
therefore perfect soldier of past war fantasies as Sloterdijk invokes these to
conclude his Critique of Cynical Reason.63 Of course there is more, as the NSA
has undone the old joke — we have met the enemy and he is us — by making it
come true, literally so. Add to that the new laws hastily instituted everywhere
criminalizing protest and “outing” anonymity. What is certain is that with all
the damage it has caused in recent decades and as it goes on and on, the war on
terrorism is a war fought in good conscience and hence the perfect war for the
“guiltlessly guilty”: who thus can fight infinitely and without remorse.
And yet, and this is the full technological metal jacket. We do not stop there,
we use other means, geological, meteorological means for waging war, and we
pretend that we have no choice, we pretend that we need energy (although
Anders pointed out that our perpetuation of our supposed need for energy was a
calculated choice, a result of a politico-economic option to ignore the abundance
of energy just for the economic sake and advantage of the strictures, the
restrictions of pretended, affected, monetizable so-called limited resources that
would then justify the utter destruction of the earth, water, air, everything.
Obviously I am speaking of fracking but also deep sea drilling to go with the
heedless destruction of the seas by industrializing fishing to reach proportions of
the same apocalyptic force that is the theme of this essay.
“What is decisive,” as Adorno wrote, “is the absorption of biological
destruction by conscious social will. Only a humanity to whom death has
become as indifferent as its members, that has itself died, can inflict it
See again, Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason. I discuss these points further in Babich,
“Sloterdijk’s Cynicism: Diogenes in the Marketplace” in: Stuart Elden, ed., Sloterdijk Now
(Oxford: Polity, 2011), pp. 17-36 and pp. 186-189.
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administratively on innumerable people.”64
And I would, extend this, as
Adorno also would, to animals, I would extend this, as Nietzsche would, to the
earth itself. Our trouble, and hence our continued interest exactly in Eichmann
– and not as Anders would say in “Eichmann’s sons,” for we are, all of, his
children — where Eichmann is only pars pro toto, a word, a signifier for the
story we tell ourselves that all our troubles in war, past and present, is always
and only about the other: the Nazi, the Russian, the phantom Al Queda
operative — like a Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtle, an invisible, omnipresent,
opponent so convenient that we could hardly resist inventing him, and so we
did. If civilian death and the destruction of human, individual habitations and
the conditions of maintaining a life was always both deliberate and regretted
and thus a problem in war and so a necessary evil in the case of Dresden,
Hiroshima, Nagasaki, such deaths need no longer be regretted because they are
no longer collateral. We send drones to kill civilians, we attack supposed
‘terrorist’ sites and cells and incidentally, having to search them out at night,
kill and rape (it’s night) women, children, and so on. We listen to Žižek because
we no longer have Baudrillard to make these points, not that scholars ever
listened to Baudrillard in his lifetime. And indeed and for the same reasons,
university scholars managed to pay no attention at all to Anders in his living
years (why ever would we: just wait long enough and one can convert that
attention into gold, that is: a university appointment of one’s own, which the
younger scholars are already planning to set aside in their good time in favor of
once, again, the next new thing, something with the word digital, or even better
prefixed with a non- or an anti-.
Thus rather than reading Anders’ critique of the bomb as limited to a time
we call the Atomic Age — as Anders himself varied Samuel Beckett’s 1957
Endgame (Fin de partie) as Endzeit that is “Endtime,”65 here invoking the
eschatological language of Jacob Taubes as Anders does —this essay connects
his reflections on the bomb with his critique of technology and the obsolescence
of humanity as of a piece with our dedication to hurling ourselves against our
own mortality. This concern with the violence of technology, this hatred of the
vulnerability of having been born and having been set on a path unto death
(the mortal path that is the path of life) inspires Anders’ engagement with the
sons of Eichmann — the heirs of those who designed and executed the Nazi
death camps and extermination chambers of the Holocaust — and the sons of
Adorno, Minima Moralia (London: Verso, 1997 [1974], p. 233).
Anders, Endzeit und Zeitenende: Gedanken über die atomare Situation (Munich: Verlag C.H.
Beck, 1972 [1950]).
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Claude Eatherly — the heirs of both those who designed and those who as pilots
(banality of banality) deployed the bombings that exploded nothing but the
stuff of the sun itself against the Empire of the Sun in the attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. We, embroiled as we are in wartime after wartime, suppressing
public protest on a scale like never before, in country after country across the
globe, cannot dispense with reflecting on that same legacy.
We stop short of bluntness and Anders was blunt. We need as much of that
as we can get.
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